Eliciting permanent and transitory undeclared work from matched administrative and survey data = A tartós és átmeneti feketefoglalkoztatás

elkülönítése kapcsolt adminisztratív és kérdőíves

adatok alapján by Elek, Péter & Köllő, János
  
 
 
BUDAPEST WORKING PAPERS  
ON THE LABOUR MARKET 
BWP – 2016/5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eliciting permanent and transitory undeclared work  
from matched administrative and survey data 
 
 
PÉTER ELEK – JÁNOS KÖLLŐ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BWP 2016/5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
BUDAPEST, 2016 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 
BWP – 2016/5 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
 
Eliciting permanent and transitory undeclared work  
from matched administrative and survey data 
 
 
Authors:  
 
 
 
Péter Elek  
assistant professor 
Department of Economics 
Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest, Hungary 
email: peter.elek@tatk.elte.hu   
 
 
 
János Köllő  
research advisor 
Institute of Economics 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
email: kollo.janos@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2016 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5594-45-8 
ISSN 1785 3788
3 
 
Eliciting permanent and transitory undeclared work 
from matched administrative and survey data 
Péter Elek – János Köllő 
Abstract  
We study the undeclared work patterns of Hungarian employees in relatively stable 
jobs, using a panel dataset that matches individual-level self-reported Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data with administrative data from the Pension Directorate for 2001–
2006. We estimate the determinants of undeclared work using Heckman-type random-
effects panel probit models, and develop a two-regime model to separate permanent 
and transitory undeclared work, where the latter follows a Markov chain. We find that 
about 6 per cent of workers went permanently unreported for six consecutive years, 
and a further 3-4 per cent were transitorily unreported in any given year. By simulating 
the permanent and transitory components of undeclared work, we examine the 
implications for health and pension eligibility. 
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A tartós és átmeneti feketefoglalkoztatás 
elkülönítése kapcsolt adminisztratív és kérdőíves 
adatok alapján  
Elek Péter – Köllő János 
Összefoglaló 
A tanulmányban a viszonylag stabil állással rendelkező munkavállalók körében 
vizsgáljuk a feketemunkát Magyarországon egy olyan paneladatbázis segítségével, 
amely egyéni szinten kapcsolja össze a KSH Munkaerő-felmérésének (MEF) adatait az 
Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóságtól (ONYF) származó adminisztratív 
adatokkal a 2001-2006 közötti időszakra. A feketefoglalkoztatást befolyásoló 
tényezőket Heckman-féle véletlen hatású (random-effects) panel probit modellekkel 
becsüljük, valamint kifejlesztünk egy látens rezsimeket tartalmazó modellt is a tartós és 
az átmeneti feketemunka szétválasztására, ahol az utóbbit Markov-folyamattal 
modellezzük. Azt találjuk, hogy a munkavállalók mintegy 6 százaléka volt tartósan 
feketén foglalkoztatott a hat egymást követő évben, és évente 3-4 százalékukat 
foglalkoztatták átmenetileg feketén. Végezetül a feketemunka tartós és átmeneti 
komponenseinek szimulációjával az egészségügyi és nyugdíjjogosultságra kifejtett 
hatásokat elemezzük.          
JEL: C23, C25, H26, J46 
 
Tárgyszavak: 
feketefoglalkoztatás, munkainput-módszer, kapcsolt adminisztratív és kérdőíves 
adatok, véletlen hatású panel probit modell endogén szelekcióval, Markov-lánc 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Undeclared employment – when the worker is not reported to the authorities and 
neither the employer nor the employee pay taxes or contributions in the relationship – 
is notoriously difficult to measure. Survey-based methods rely on information directly 
provided by the population, but these tend to underestimate the true magnitude of 
black work, and are strongly affected by cultural differences. For instance, according to 
the Eurobarometer Survey, only 4 per cent of the EU population responded in 2013 
that they had undertaken undeclared paid work in the preceding year (European 
Commission, 2014); the highest rates were recorded in Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Estonia and Denmark (9–11 per cent), while Southern European countries reported 
very low rates (1–3 per cent in Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, Italy and Greece).  
Indirect methods estimate total employment with observable proxies, and compare 
these with reported employment figures to obtain a measure of undeclared work. A 
wide range of techniques fall into this category,1 the most promising being the 
discrepancy or labour input method, which was advocated by a task force as a 
methodologically appropriate tool for EU-wide measurement of undeclared work 
(GHK/FGB, 2009). This technique assumes that labour force surveys register most of 
the undeclared work because individuals are not motivated to conceal their true 
employment status in an unofficial interview. Hence undeclared work can be 
approximated by comparing Labour Force Survey (LFS) employment with registered 
employment figures, which may come from administrative sources or enterprise 
surveys. This method – in line with other indirect techniques (Schneider, 2012) – yields 
considerably larger estimates of undeclared work than do survey-based methods: e.g. 
16–17 per cent of total employment in Hungary between 2001 and 2005 (Elek et al., 
2009; Benedek et al., 2013) and 8–30 per cent of various macroeconomic aggregates in 
European countries.2 These estimates do not suffer from the underreporting bias of 
surveys, but they are generally not suitable for multivariate analysis, because only 
group-wise comparisons are possible, across dimensions that are available in both data 
                                                 
1 Examples are the consumption-income discrepancy method, the monetary method, the 
electricity consumption method and econometric methods such as MIMIC (Renooy et al., 2004; 
Schneider, 2012).  
2 For instance, 11.5 per cent of employment in full-time equivalent units for Italy in 2004 
(Baldassarini, 2007), 17–21 per cent of official GDP for Slovenia between 1995 and 2004 
(Nastav and Bojnec, 2007), 8 per cent of total employment for Spain in 2002 and 20–30 per 
cent of GDP for Romania between 1996 and 2002 (for these and other EU country results, see 
GHK/FGB, 2009, pp. 49 and 77). 
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sources. Hence, most analysis using the labour input method provides only sectoral, 
regional or gender-specific breakdown (GHK/FGB, 2009). 
In this paper, we exploit a unique panel dataset from Hungary that matches self-
reported and administrative employment data at the individual level. The data relate to 
workers who reported at least two years of uninterrupted tenure in the jobs they held in 
January–March 2008, when they were interviewed for the LFS. We assess the 
pensionable years they accrued in 2001–2006, using quality-checked administrative 
data provided by the National Pension Insurance Directorate (NPID). The matched 
data enable us to combine the strengths of the ‘labour input’ method and survey-based 
methods by analysing the determinants of undeclared work in a multivariate setting. 
We examine the data with regard to biases stemming from non-random sampling, 
recall bias on the part of LFS respondents, and technical failures and negligence on the 
part of employers, the NPID or the postal service. 
Our dataset was created by asking LFS respondents to permit the NPID and the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office to link their responses to their retrospective 
employment data stored at the NPID. The positive response rate was around 25 per 
cent, and the incentive offered – for an individual to acquire her official employment 
history – was likely to be related to the time spent undeclared; hence the matched 
sample is non-random. Therefore, besides using random-effects (RE) panel linear and 
probit models, we also estimate an RE panel probit with endogenous selection to 
control for self-selection. We exploit the rotating panel structure of the LFS to find 
suitable instruments that influence the sampling probability, without affecting the 
incidence of undeclared work. The model is estimated by maximum simulated 
likelihood, using adaptive quadrature (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004). 
As a further advantage, the dataset allows us to separate permanent and transitory 
non-reporting. Of those workers who were observed in the sample for six years, around 
6–7 per cent were never reported; around 3 per cent were unreported only once; and 
around 3.5 per cent were unreported between two and five times. We build a two-
regime model, where both permanent and transitory non-reporting probabilities 
depend on the observables through probit link functions, and where transitory non-
reporting follows a Markov chain. The model is estimated with maximum likelihood.  
Retrospective data on the observed workers suggest that of the 9.5–11 per cent non-
reporting ratio, more than 8 per cent was predictably due to the non-reporting of actual 
work activity rather than breaks in the employment relationship. The econometric 
estimates (especially those relating to permanently unreported workers) offer support 
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for the hypothesis that the bulk of non-reporting reflects informal employment, 
because – in line with other studies – they predict lower reporting rates  in, for 
example, agriculture and transport, various forms of atypical work, among males and in 
small firms. Finally, the two-regime model allows us to examine the consequences of 
undeclared work on access to health care and pensions.  
Our analysis relates to two strands of existing literature. According to the 
traditional economic approach (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002), economic actors make 
decisions about tax evasion by comparing expected fines and the amount of tax that can 
be evaded. Therefore, tax evasion is reduced by higher individual risk aversion, 
stronger deterrence and lower tax rates (Buehn and Schneider, 2012). However, it is 
difficult to explain willingness to pay taxes using the standard economic model – 
considering the limited risk of being caught and the rates of potential fines – and 
therefore more recent literature incorporates the effect of the social environment, such 
as rule following, the need to belong to groups and other interactions (Feld and Larsen, 
2012; Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014). The monopsonistic position of employers and the low 
bargaining power of employees may also be important (Cichocki and Tyrowicz, 2010). 
Our estimates of differences in undeclared work across gender, level of education, work 
experience, occupation, place of residence, sector, size and ownership of the employer 
provide insight into how differences in risk aversion, the expected costs of cheating and 
social interactions influence the prevalence of undeclared work. These results 
complement already existing cross-sectional multivariate analyses of undeclared work, 
which are, however, mainly available from survey-based studies (Williams, 2007; Feld 
and Larsen, 2012; European Commission, 2014). 
By giving a detailed description of the dynamics of non-reporting, our approach is 
also related to the literature that models measurement error in earnings using matched 
administrative and survey data (Pischke, 1995; Abowd and Stinson, 2013). A few papers 
focus specifically on tax evasion using matched microdata (Baldini et al., 2009; Paulus, 
2015). However, in contrast to our paper, that stream of literature does not concentrate 
on undeclared work (i.e. full income tax evasion) and also follows a different 
econometrics modelling framework, because earnings are continuous, whereas our 
undeclared work dummy is a binary variable. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset, Section 3 
describes the econometric models, while Section 4 provides the multivariate results and 
sheds light on long-term consequences with simulations. Finally, Section 5 offers some 
conclusions.  
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2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
2.1 DATA  
Formation of the sample. As was already mentioned, in January–March 2008, LFS 
respondents were offered the chance to obtain precise information about their 
registered accrual years, and were asked in return to permit the NPID and the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office to use their merged data for research purposes.3 
The dataset created in this way contains all variables of the LFS wave and the 
respondents’ annual reported days in work between their first appearance in the NPID 
register and December 2007.  
We omit the data for 2007 because there is a delay in compiling and quality-
checking the NPID register, which makes the 2007 data unreliable. By excluding 
workers who started their spells in work in January 2006 or later, we underestimate 
the incidence of black work, since this is expected to occur more frequently in marginal, 
high-turnover jobs.  
We also restrict the period of observation from below. As shown in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix, the reporting rate of small firms was low before 1999 (see Köllő, 2015 for 
more details). In 1999, when firms were obliged for the first time to add their tax ID to 
their pension contribution reports, the propensity of small firms to report leapt and 
then fell slightly in 2000. As from 2001, reporting rates settled down at levels that have 
continued until recently. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 2001–2006. After this 
restriction, we end up with a sample of 23,385 person-years, covering 4,707 workers.  
Dealing with biases. Our key variable measures reported days in each full year that 
the respondent spent with the employer: if the worker entered the firm in year t, we 
measure her reported days in years t+1, t+2, …, 2006. Registered days within a full year 
can vary between zero and 365 (or 366), since holidays and paid leave are counted as 
insured periods. We would expect 100 per cent of the time that workers spent with their 
employers to appear in the NPID register, and so we can interpret the difference 
between reported and total days as a measure of unregistered work. However, our key 
measure is subject to biases for at least three reasons: (i) the sample is non-random; (ii) 
employment spells perceived by the LFS respondents as continuous may not be 
                                                 
3 Hungarians typically have no precise information on their accumulated accrual points and 
expected pensions before they actually retire. The computer records (since 1988) and printed 
material that records registered workdays and contribution payments are available to 
individuals before their retirement only after a lengthy administrative procedure.  
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regarded as continuous by the NPID; and (iii) some NPID records may be missing for 
technical reasons (unsent or lost). 
Sample selection bias. Of the 31,195 LFS respondents over 15 years of age and not 
in receipt of a pension in 2008, some 7,654 (25 per cent) requested information from 
the NPID (of these, 4,707 were employed according to the LFS). Selection for the LFS–
NPID sample was presumably non-random. We allow for self-selection in two ways. 
First, we use observables to estimate the probability (p) that an LFS respondent 
requested information from the NPID (see the selection equation later in Section 3.2 
and the results in Table 5) and apply 1/p and the product of 1/p and the LFS weight 
(w/p) as weights, to give a reweighted estimate of aggregate non-reporting. Statistics 
with and without weighting suggest that the results are weakly affected by the 
weighting scheme (see Table 1). For further details, see Bálint et al. (2010).  
Beyond observables, selection to the LFS–NPID sample could potentially be 
affected by unobservables that also influence the probability of undeclared work. To 
tackle this problem, we use two instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
probability of being in the sample, but are uncorrelated with registration history. We 
discuss these in detail in Section 3.2.  
Unreported work versus temporary breaks. The share of declared working days 
during a permanent-looking employment spell may fall short of the expected 100 per 
cent for reasons other than non-reporting. Seasonal slumps, stoppages, strikes, unpaid 
leave and absenteeism may cause breaks in the spell of employment, without 
dissolution of the employment relationship. Thanks to retrospective questions in the 
LFS, we are in a position to measure the incidence of such ‘real’ breaks with some 
precision. The event of interest is non-employment (by ILO/OECD standards) during a 
permanent employment relationship. For the study of such events, we selected 
employed workers from the 2001–2006 waves of the LFS, who had entered their jobs 
more than 12 months before the LFS interview and counted those who said that exactly 
12 months before the interview they had not been working. However, only a tiny 
minority – around 1.5 per cent – of those in permanent employment reported breaks in 
work. These figures, compared to 9.5–11 per cent missing from the NPID register 
(Table 1), suggest that the difference between LFS-reported and registered employment 
stems primarily from underreporting. 
Accounting for administrative failure. Unsent and lost reports are unlikely to 
explain why one’s NPID data are missing for protracted periods, but they can inflate 
our non-reporting measure for shorter terms. Therefore, we shall pay due attention to 
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the duration of non-reporting by estimating a joint model for short (especially one year 
long) and permanent spells of unreported work.  
2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As shown in Table 1, depending on the weighting method, some 9.5–11 per cent of 
working days were unreported to the NPID on average in 2001–2006. Underreporting 
means no reporting at all in the vast majority of cases: in the unweighted sample, 
instances where the firm did not report the employment relationship at all in a given 
year accounted for 8 of the missing 9.5 per cent. In the forthcoming sections we will 
regard a worker as ‘unreported’ if the fraction of her reported days falls short of 50 per 
cent of all days in a given year – the average of this dummy variable (9.2 per cent) is 
roughly the same as the ratio of unreported days (9.5 per cent in the unweighted 
sample).  
Table 1 
 Non-reporting rates (2001–2006 annual averages, per cent) 
 Unreported 
days 
Zero  
per cent  
Less than 50 
per cent  
Less than 95 
per cent  
  of workdays reported in the given year 
Unweighted sample 9.5 8.0 9.2 11.7 
Weighted with LFS weights (w) 9.9 8.4 9.6 12.1 
Weighted with 1/p 10.2 8.4 9.9 12.7 
Weighted with w/p 11.0 9.2 10.6 13.5 
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample. p = estimated sampling probability based on observables.  
Number of observations: 23,385 person-years covering 4,707 workers.  
 
These estimates of undeclared work are substantial, but – as a result of focusing on 
relatively stable jobs – are smaller than the figures obtained by comparing aggregate 
LFS and NPID employment data, which yield 16–17 per cent for undeclared work in 
Hungary in 2001–2006 (Elek et al., 2009 and Benedek et al., 2013 for 2001–2005; 
own calculations for 2006).  
Table 2 draws attention to three sizeable unreported groups. Among workers 
observed throughout the period of six years, around 50 per cent were permanently 
unreported, 25 per cent had a single unreported year, and a further 25 per cent were 
unreported 2–5 times (6.5, 3.2 and 3.5 per cent, respectively). Single-year and 
permanent non-reporting dominate in groups observed for shorter periods as well. 
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Table 2 
 The distribution of observed workers by number of years  
in the sample and number of unreported years 
Number of workers Unreported years  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total Per 
cent 
Years in sample          
1 325 29 0 0 0 0 0 354 7.5% 
2 283 24 22 0 0 0 0 329 7.0% 
3 264 17 3 11 0 0 0 295 6.3% 
4 248 24 9 3 27 0 0 311 6.6% 
5 212 19 10 4 4 15 0 264 5.6% 
6 2,735 102 42 24 19 26 206 3,154 67.0% 
Total 4,067 215 86 42 50 41 206 4,707 100.0% 
Per cent          
if years in sample = 6 86.7 3.2 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.8 6.5 100.0  
in Total 86.4 4.6 1.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 4.4 100.0  
in Total all years unreported (i.e. diagonal elements) = 6.6%  
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample. Unreported year = less than half of the workdays are 
reported.  
 
Transition probabilities between reported and unreported spells are displayed in 
Table 3 for those who were declared to the authorities at least once during their 
observed employment period. On average, 1.1 per cent of reported workers became 
unreported in the next period, and around half of the temporarily (i.e. not 
permanently) unreported workers returned to a reported state one year later.  
Table 3 
Transition probabilities between reported and unreported years among 
workers who were reported at least once during their observed 
employment period 
 Last year  If last year = unreported 
 Reported Unreported If previous unreported spell If tenure 
= 1 year This year   = 1 year > 1 year unknown 
Number of workers 
Reported 16,751 259 65 84 29 81 
Unreported 189 269 72 136 39 22 
Per cent       
Reported 98.9 49.0 47.4 38.2 42.6 78.6 
Unreported 1.1 51.0 52.6 61.8 57.4 21.4 
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample. The unreported spell has unknown duration for left-
censored observations. Tenure refers to the number of years in the current job. 
Number of observations: 17,468 person-years covering 4,073 workers who were reported at 
least once during their observed employment spell.  
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The probabilities of returning to reported work after one year, after more than one 
year, or – in the case of a left-censored duration – after an unknown number of 
unreported years are around 40–50 per cent, and do not differ significantly from each 
other,4 suggesting that the dynamics of temporary non-reporting follows a Markov 
chain, with an average duration of two years in the unreported state. There is one 
exception to this simple Markov rule: people who were unreported in their first full 
year in their current job had a significantly higher (around 80 per cent) probability of 
transition to reported work after that year (Table 3). This will be taken into account in 
model building.  
Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes average non-reporting rates in selected 
groups. Men are more likely to be unreported, and are much more likely than women to 
be permanently unreported. Undeclared work occurs most frequently among workers 
with secondary education (some of them awaiting college admission) and least 
frequently among those with a university degree; the differences by education are 
larger for permanent non-reporting. The reporting rates are low for the self-employed; 
very low for casual workers; and below average among farmers, skilled service and 
construction workers, porters, guards and people doing elementary jobs. Part-timers 
are less likely to be reported than are full-timers. Undeclared work is very frequent in 
telework. Also, people in their first full year in their current job are about 3 percentage 
points more likely to be unreported than other workers.  
Foreign-owned firms have a much lower non-reporting rate than domestically 
owned firms (3 versus 10 per cent). The share of unreported days does not exceed 7 per 
cent in firms that employ five or more workers, but is around 12 per cent in firms 
employing 2–4 workers and exceeds 30 per cent in sole proprietorships. Permanent 
undeclared work seems to be more heterogeneous across groups than transitory non-
reporting.  
3. METHODS   
3.1 BASELINE MODELS 
In our baseline specifications, we apply random-effects (RE) linear and probit models 
to identify the impact of demographic and economic variables on the prevalence of 
undeclared work: 
                                                 
4 Homogeneity of the three distributions is not rejected by a chi-squared test (p-value is 0.22).  
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(1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑿𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑁 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑁 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑁, 
(2) 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼{𝑿𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑃 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑃 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑃 > 0}, 
where the dependent variables are 𝑅𝑖𝑡, the ratio of unreported days, and 𝑄𝑖𝑡, the 
dummy variable of being unreported in more than half of the year for person 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
The indicator function of event 𝐴 is denoted by 𝐼{𝐴}. The time-varying error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑃  
follows a standard normal distribution in the probit case, while the distribution of 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑁 
may be left unspecified (apart from a zero-mean restriction) in the linear case. The 
individual-level unobserved heterogeneities (𝑐𝑖
𝑁 and 𝑐𝑖
𝑃) have zero mean, are 
independent of the 𝑢𝑖𝑡-s and of the explanatory variables, and follow – in the probit 
case – a normal distribution.  
Vector 𝑿𝑖𝑡 denotes the constant and the individual- and firm-level explanatory 
variables, while 𝜷𝑁, 𝜷𝑃 are their parameters in the two models. Some of these variables 
(such as tenure, work experience and year fixed effects) are time-varying, but others – 
as a consequence of the survey design (see Section 2.1) – are measured in 2008 in the 
LFS. These include personal characteristics (gender, level of education, dummy for 
capital Budapest, unemployment rate of the micro-region), employer characteristics 
(sector, firm size, firm ownership), type of employment and other employment 
variables (part-time and atypical employment, telework, irregular work patterns). For 
the full list of variables, see Tables 4 and 5. 
The majority of the above variables are either fixed in time (such as gender) or can 
be treated as time-invariant because they refer to the individual’s work history within 
the same firm (e.g. sector of the firm). Nevertheless, some variables (such as firm size, 
firm ownership or type of employment) may have changed during the employment 
spell, and this should be taken into account when interpreting the parameter estimates. 
We estimate the RE linear model by RE-GLS, and display autocorrelation- and 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We estimate the RE probit model using 
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) with adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature.5 To 
compare results with the RE linear model, we also calculate the average marginal 
                                                 
5 The likelihood function in the RE probit model is given as an integral with respect to the 
unobserved heterogeneity 𝑐𝑖
𝑃. In the MSL procedure this is approximated with adaptive Gauss–
Hermite quadrature and then maximized. We use 12 integration points, but the results are not 
sensitive to this choice. Technically, the estimates are obtained with the xtprobit command of 
the Stata software (version 12).  
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effects of the variables on Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1) from the RE probit model, where we integrate out 
the 𝑐𝑖
𝑃 random effects.6  
3.2 MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SELECTION  
As described in detail in Section 2.1, selection into the panel dataset was non-random. 
The incentive for an individual to obtain her official employment history is likely to 
have been directly related to the time spent undeclared, the dependent variable in the 
equations. Hence the parameter estimates on the selected sample are not necessarily 
consistent. This is a Heckman-type selection problem, and one solution is to find 
suitable instrumental variables (IVs) that influence the sampling probability, but 
otherwise can be treated as random in relation to the prevalence of undeclared work. 
Since the LFS is a rotating panel, where units are followed for up to six consecutive 
quarters, one candidate for such an IV is the sequence number of the visit of the 
pollster, when she asked the respondent for permission to be included in the matched 
LFS–NPID sample. On average, the first visit of the pollster takes much longer and is 
more elaborate than subsequent visits, because it takes time to get acquainted with the 
sampled household, give the members an overview of the LFS and inform them of the 
possibility to obtain information about their accrual years. Hence we expect – and in 
fact we find (see Table 4 in Section 4.1) – that the first LFS visit is associated with a 
greater probability of getting into the matched sample than are subsequent visits, even 
after controlling for the observables. On the other hand, the quarter in which a 
respondent first appears in the LFS is random, and hence the sequence number of the 
LFS visit is unrelated to the respondent’s time spent undeclared.  
A second possible IV is the duration of the LFS interview, which is also recorded in 
the LFS database. A longer interview is associated with a higher sampling probability, 
even after controlling for the observables (Table 4). However, we do not expect it to be 
related to the prevalence of undeclared work.  
We model selection into the matched LFS–NPID panel in a probit framework:  
(3) 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐼{𝑿𝑖𝜹 + 𝒁𝑖𝜼 + 𝑣𝑖 > 0}, 
where 𝑆𝑖 denotes the dummy variable for being included in the matched LFS–NPID 
sample, 𝒁𝑖 is the vector of the above two IVs, 𝑿𝑖 is the vector of observables in year 
2006 (i.e. 𝑿𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖,2006), which are all calculated from the LFS and hence are observed 
                                                 
6 The average marginal effects are calculated using the gllapred command of the GLLAMM 
package of Stata, after bootstrapping the estimated model 1,000 times. 
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for all respondents, not just for those in the matched sample, 𝜹 and 𝜼 are the 
corresponding parameter vectors, and 𝑣𝑖 is a standard normally distributed random 
variable. 
The structural equation for the dummy variable of undeclared work is given by the 
panel probit model (equation (2)),7 but data for that equation are only available on the 
matched sample (𝑆𝑖 = 1). In the model of endogenous selection, the two equations ((2) 
and (3)) are related by the assumption that 
(4) corr(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖
𝑃) = 𝜌.  
If 𝜌 = 0, then equation (3) does not provide additional information on the 
structural equation (2), but otherwise the two equations should be tackled jointly. We 
estimate the system with maximum simulated likelihood, using adaptive quadrature.8 
We calculate the average marginal effects of the explanatory variables on Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1), 
with the 𝑐𝑖
𝑃 random effects integrated out. 
The reciprocal of the sampling probabilities estimated from equation (3) was used 
as a weight to obtain the aggregate prevalence of non-reporting in Table 1. 
3.3 SEPARATING PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY NON-REPORTING  
The above panel regressions do not explicitly model the time series properties of the 
non-reporting process, although such a dynamic model – if well specified – could not 
only be used in long-term dynamic simulations, but would also give more efficient 
estimates of the effects of observables on undeclared work. The descriptive results in 
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 𝑄𝑖𝑡, the dummy for undeclared work,9 follows a two-regime 
model: either 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1 holds for all years (permanent undeclared work) for a particular 
person, or 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is – conditionally on the observables – a Markov chain (transitory 
undeclared work). 
 
                                                 
7 We do not use the linear specification (equation (1)) in models with endogenous selection, 
because the estimation of such models depends crucially on distributional assumptions imposed 
on the error terms (e.g. normality). 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is close to binary, and hence a binary model on 𝑄𝑖𝑡  is 
more appropriate.  
8 Technically, the system is estimated using the GLLAMM package of the Stata software (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2004).  
9 To keep the model structure relatively simple, we do not incorporate endogenous selection into 
the two-regime model. According to Section 4.2, the model with endogenous selection yields 
qualitatively similar results to the baseline ones. 
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More formally, let person i have explanatory variables 𝑿𝑖𝑡 in year 𝑡 (and in 
particular the tenure in her current job in years, 𝐶𝑖𝑡), time-independent explanatory 
variables 𝑿𝑖,10 and let us denote her latent (unobservable) regime by 𝐽𝑖, which can take 
value 1 (permanent non-reporting) or 0 (transitory non-reporting). The probability of 
the permanent regime is given by: 
(5) Pr(𝐽𝑖 = 1 | 𝑿𝑖) = Φ(𝑿𝑖𝜷𝑍), 
where Φ stands for the standard normal distribution function and 𝜷𝑍 is the parameter 
vector describing the probability of permanent undeclared work.  
The conditional probability of being undeclared is trivial for the permanent regime: 
(6) Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝐽𝑖 = 1) = 1 
while it is given as a function of the previous year’s state for the transitory regime: 
(7) Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1 |(𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0 or  𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 1), 𝐽𝑖 = 0, 𝑿𝑖𝑡) =  Φ(𝑿𝑖𝑡𝜷𝑇) = 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(01)
= 1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(00)
 
(8) Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1, 𝐽𝑖 = 0, 𝑿𝑖𝑡) =  1 − Φ(𝑟0 + 𝑟1 ∗ 𝐼{𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 2}) = 
= 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(11) = 1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(10)
, 
where 𝜷𝑇 is the parameter vector determining the transition probability from the 
reported to the unreported state, while the transition probability in the other direction 
is given by Φ(𝑟0) in general and Φ(𝑟0 + 𝑟1) specifically after the first full year of tenure. 
The probabilities in the first year of tenure (i.e. when 𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 1 and hence 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 is not 
defined) are formally the same as for 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, but in practice they may differ because 
𝑿𝑖𝑡 contains 𝐶𝑖𝑡. Finally, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(01)
, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(00)
, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(11)
 and 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(10)
 are just short notations for the 
corresponding transition probabilities. Because of the small sample size in transitory 
non-reporting (see Table 3), we do not model 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(11)
 as a function of observables beyond 
𝐶𝑖𝑡.  
 
 
Although 𝐽𝑖 is not observed (a worker can be unreported by chance throughout her 
observed employment spell, even if she belongs to the transitory regime), the model can 
                                                 
10 The notation here differs slightly from the previous section because 𝑿𝑖  now does not contain 
the year 2006 values of the time-varying variables (work experience and tenure).  
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be estimated by maximum likelihood. Indeed, the likelihood function can be obtained 
by distinguishing between the cases of being reported at least once and never being 
reported. Let 𝑡𝑖 denote worker 𝑖’s first year in the sample (which can take values 
between 2001 and 2006) and let us use the notations 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(𝑘)
= Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 | 𝐽𝑖 = 0, 𝑿𝑖𝑡) for 
the probability of transitory non-reporting (𝑘 = 1) and reporting (𝑘 = 0), respectively, 
at time 𝑡. If ∏ 𝑄𝑖𝑡
2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖 = 0 (i.e. if the person is reported at least once), then for 𝑘𝑡 ∈ {0,1} 
(𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖, … , 2006): 
(9) Pr(⋂ {𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡} | {𝑿𝑖𝑡}
2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖
) = (1 − Φ(𝑿𝑖𝜷𝑍)) ∗ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑖
(𝑘𝑡𝑖) ∗ ∏ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(𝑘𝑡−1,𝑘𝑡)2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖+1
  
and if ∏ 𝑄𝑖𝑡
2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖 = 1 (i.e. if the person is never reported), then  
(10) Pr(⋂ {𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 1} | {𝑿𝑖𝑡}
2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖
) = Φ(𝑿𝑖𝜷𝑍) + (1 − Φ(𝑿𝑖𝜷𝑍)) ∗ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑖
(1) ∗ ∏ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(11)2006
𝑡=𝑡𝑖+1
.  
The first term in the latter expression shows the contribution of the permanent 
regime; the second term that of the transitory regime. 
For workers who entered the sample at the start of their current job (i.e. for whom 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝑖 = 1), equation (7) implies that 𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑖
(𝑘) = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝑖
(0,𝑘)
 and hence the likelihood calculation is 
complete for them. However, the majority of our observations are left-censored because 
𝐶𝑖,2001 > 1 for most workers who entered our sample in 2001. The missing observations 
from their work history can be tackled, for instance, using the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm, or we can follow a computationally less intensive but 
equally satisfactory approach. Indeed, we first note that 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(1)
 can be calculated 
recursively: 
(11) 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(1)
= 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(11)
∗ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
(1)
+ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(01)
∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
(1)
), 
hence, to obtain 𝑝𝑖,2001
(1)
 and 𝑝𝑖,2001
(0)
 – only they are needed in equations (9)–(10) for the 
likelihood – we can go back to (for example) year 1997 and approximate 𝑝𝑖,1997
(1)
 as the 
stationary distribution of the two-state Markov chain whose transition probabilities are 
fixed at their 1997 levels: 
(12) 𝑝𝑖,1997
(1)
≈ 𝑝𝑖,1997
(01)
(𝑝𝑖,1997
(10)
+ 𝑝𝑖,1997
(01)
)⁄ . 
This final step is only an approximation, because (1) the transition probabilities are 
slightly time-varying and (2) the Markov chain may not have reached the stationary 
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distribution for some workers by 1997. Nevertheless, since the probability of return to 
the reported state, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(10)
, turns out to be relatively large in our case (see Section 4.1), the 
corresponding Markov chain has good mixing properties, and it seems to be enough to 
go back four years in time to get a satisfactory approximation for 𝑝𝑖,2001
(1)
 in equations 
(9)–(10). We note that the maximum likelihood estimates turn out to be almost 
identical, irrespective of whether 1996, 1997 or 1998 is used as the start year in the 
approximation.  
After estimating the two-regime model with maximum likelihood, we also calculate 
the average marginal effects of the covariates on the permanent and transitory non-
reporting probabilities, using the probit link functions.   
4. RESULTS 
4.1 GENERAL FINDINGS 
Turning to the multivariate results, Table 4 displays the parameter estimates of the RE 
probit model (equation (2)), the RE probit model with endogenous selection (equations 
(2)–(4) estimated as a system), and the two-regime model that separates permanent 
and transitory undeclared work (equations (5)–(8)). Table 5 shows the average 
marginal effects calculated from these models and from the simple RE linear model 
(equation (1)).  
We first make some general remarks on the estimates. As expected, the correlation 
between the error terms of the selection and the structural equation in the endogenous 
model is significantly negative (𝜌 < 0 in equation (4)), i.e. undeclared workers were less 
likely to allow the researchers to obtain their official employment history. However, the 
majority of the marginal effect estimates are similar in the RE probit models with and 
without endogenous selection, although the standard errors are larger and thus some 
estimates are insignificant in the former. Hence we summarize the results from these 
models together.  
According to the two-regime model, the average probability of belonging to the 
permanent regime was around 5.6 per cent. This is somewhat smaller than the 
observed ratio of never-reported respondents (see Table 2), because some workers in 
the transitory regime happen to be unreported during their whole observed period. If a 
worker was in the transitory regime, her average transition probability was 1.8 per cent 
from the reported to the non-reported state, and 36 per cent in the other direction (64 
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per cent after the first full year of tenure at the current employer, and 34 per cent 
otherwise). Although the unreported dummy does not have a stationary distribution in 
the transitory regime because of the time-varying transition probabilities, we can 
simulate the transitions in our six-year-wide window of observation and find that the 
average probability of being in the non-reported state – conditionally on being in the 
transitory regime – was around 3.7 per cent. Taking permanent and transitory non-
reporting together, the average simulated ratio of being unreported in a given year is 
around 9.0 per cent, in good accordance with the observed ratio. Further details of 
goodness of fit of the two-regime model are given in Section 4.3. 
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Table 4 
Parameter estimates of the multivariate models 
 RE probit RE probit with selection Permanent regime Transitory regime 
 (equation (2)) 
structural  
(equation (2)) 
selection  
(equation (3)) (equation (5)) 
reporting to  
non-reporting 
(equation (7)) 
Gender           
Male 0.79*** (0.13) 1.0*** (0.15) -0.076*** (0.026) 0.56*** (0.10) 0.12** (0.053) 
Level of education (2008) (baseline = vocational or general secondary school) 
Primary or less (0–8 classes) -0.32* (0.19) 0.0016 (0.22) -0.12*** (0.040) -0.40*** (0.15) 0.032 (0.080) 
Apprentice-based vocational -0.36*** (0.13) -0.29* (0.16) -0.021 (0.030) -0.41*** (0.11) 0.044 (0.058) 
College -0.36* (0.19) -0.25 (0.24) 0.030 (0.041) -0.33** (0.16) 0.059 (0.081) 
University -0.86*** (0.29) -0.36 (0.44) -0.24*** (0.054) -0.66** (0.27) -0.048 (0.12) 
Tenure in current job 
First full year 0.53*** (0.095) 0.65*** (0.11) 0.0022 (0.0015)   0.67*** (0.066) 
Number of years x 10 -0.15** (0.071) -0.19** (0.086)     -0.097*** (0.034) 
Work experience since leaving school 
Number of years x 10 -1.5*** (0.22) -2.3*** (0.28) 0.90*** (0.056)   -0.56*** (0.10) 
Squared number of years x 100 0.31*** (0.049) 0.42*** (0.060) -0.14*** (0.011)   0.12*** (0.023) 
Type of employment relationship (2008) (baseline = employee) 
Employee of a sole proprietor 0.47* (0.26) 0.73** (0.34) 0.0049 (0.061) -0.17 (0.29) 0.34*** (0.098) 
Casual worker 9.3*** (1.5) 12.5*** (0.95) -0.35 (0.22) 3.4*** (0.74) 1.5** (0.77) 
Self-employed 0.19 (0.26) 0.28 (0.37) -0.14** (0.066) 0.35 (0.22) -0.025 (0.12) 
Member of an unincorporated company -0.59* (0.35) -0.56 (0.44) -0.11 (0.074) -0.31 (0.30) -0.11 (0.14) 
Work schedule (2008) 
Part-time 2.4*** (0.31) 3.1*** (0.34) -0.22*** (0.067) 1.0*** (0.21) 0.60*** (0.11) 
Evening, night, weekend work  0.21* (0.12) 0.34** (0.14) -0.0082 (0.026) 0.19** (0.095) -0.031 (0.052) 
Telework  1.21*** (0.32) 1.2*** (0.38) 0.072 (0.073) 0.59*** (0.17) 0.083 (0.12) 
Irregular work pattern 0.52*** (0.16) 0.70*** (0.18) -0.027 (0.039) 0.21* (0.11) 0.13* (0.072) 
Firm ownership (2008) 
Foreign (more than 50 per cent) -0.60*** (0.22) -0.53** (0.27) 0.0018 (0.039) -0.22 (0.23) -0.23** (0.092) 
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Firm size (number of employees, 2008) (baseline = more than 10) 
1 2.02*** (0.32) 3.0*** (0.42) -0.061 (0.076) 0.58** (0.23) 0.47*** (0.13) 
2–4 0.40** (0.19) 0.50** (0.25) -0.047 (0.045) 0.092 (0.18) 0.010 (0.084) 
5–10 -0.17 (0.22) -0.23 (0.27) 0.030 (0.045) -0.74* (0.38) 0.091 (0.082) 
does not know (but < 11) 0.51 (0.47) 0.62 (0.65) -0.14 (0.11) 0.26 (0.38) -0.098 (0.24) 
Economic sector (2008) (baseline = industry) 
Agriculture 1.95*** (0.20) 1.6*** (0.31) 0.23*** (0.052) 0.99*** (0.16) 0.28*** (0.090) 
Construction 0.70*** (0.23) 1.1*** (0.28) -0.21*** (0.052) 0.0011 (0.30) 0.32*** (0.093) 
Transportation 2.6*** (0.23) 3.7*** (0.27) -0.048 (0.053) 1.3*** (0.16) 0.23** (0.10) 
Trade and accommodation 0.047 (0.21) 0.39 (0.25) -0.18*** (0.040) -0.37 (0.26) 0.059 (0.081) 
Services 0.39* (0.21) 0.60** (0.27) -0.14*** (0.044) 0.047 (0.22) 0.20** (0.085) 
Education, health, public admin. 0.77*** (0.18) 0.79*** (0.21) -0.039 (0.038) 0.61*** (0.16) 0.053 (0.078) 
Region (2008) 
Micro-regional unemployment rate 2.5** (1.1) -0.39 (1.3) 0.016*** (0.0025) 2.1** (0.85) -0.46 (0.50) 
Capital Budapest 1.1*** (0.26) 2.3*** (0.36) -0.62*** (0.052) 0.56** (0.22) 0.21* (0.11) 
Year (baseline = 2001)           
Year: 2002 0.042 (0.097) 0.087 (0.11)     -0.015 (0.076) 
Year: 2003 -0.021 (0.097) 0.036 (0.11)     0.0022 (0.074) 
Year: 2004 -0.099 (0.099) -0.027 (0.11)     -0.11 (0.076) 
Year: 2005 -0.22** (0.10) -0.16 (0.11)     -0.13* (0.077) 
Year: 2006 -0.13 (0.10) -0.020 (0.12)     -0.041 (0.071) 
Exogenous variables in selection equation (2008) 
Sequence number of LFS visit     -0.029*** (0.0069)     
Length of LFS interview (minute)     0.022*** (0.0025)     
Constant -4.4*** (0.32) -2.8*** (0.43) -2.1*** (0.087) -2.7*** (0.19) -1.8*** (0.14) 
 
non-reporting to  
reporting 
 (equation (8)) 
First full year in current job         0.77*** (0.13) 
Constant         -0.40*** (0.075) 
𝜎(𝑐𝑖) 3.2*** (0.066) 6.9*** (0.40)       
𝜌 (in equation (4))   -0.50*** (0.044)       
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Note: matched LFS–NPID sample. The RE probit models with and without selection were estimated with maximum simulated likelihood using adaptive 
quadrature with 12 integration points. The two-regime model was estimated with maximum likelihood.  
See Table 5 for the parameter estimates of the RE linear model (equation (1)). Additional parameter estimates of that model: 𝜎(𝑐𝑖) = 0.23 and 𝜎(𝑢𝑖𝑡) =
0.12.  
All explanatory variables except for work experience and tenure refer to year 2008 measurements in LFS.  
Number of person-years: 23,385. Number of people: 4,707. Notations for significance: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.  
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Table 5 
 Average marginal effects on the percentage probability of undeclared work from the multivariate models 
 
 RE linear RE probit 
RE probit  
with selection 
Permanent  
regime 
Transitory  
regime 
 (equation (1)) (equation (2)) (equation (2)) (equation (5)) 
from reporting  
to non-reporting 
(equation (7)) 
(Average estimated probability)    5.6 (0.36) 1.8 (0.11) 
Gender        
Male 3.8*** (0.86) 3.3*** (0.55) 4.2*** (0.9) 4.2*** (0.81) 0.46** (0.21) 
Level of education (2008) (baseline = vocational or general secondary school) 
Primary or less (0–8 classes) -1.9 (1.2) -1.4 (0.86) 0.0062 (1.0) -3.2*** (1.1) 0.15 (0.32) 
Vocational -2.0** (0.92) -1.6*** (0.52) -1.3* (0.67) -3.6*** (0.93) 0.18 (0.24) 
College -2.1* (1.1) -1.4** (0.70) -0.94 (0.94) -2.6** (1.1) 0.22 (0.30) 
University -4.9*** (1.5) -3.1*** (0.88) -1.4 (1.8) -4.3*** (1.4) -0.12 (0.39) 
Tenure in current job 
First full year 3.8*** (0.60) 2.4*** (0.47) 3.1*** (0.77)   4.3*** (0.64) 
Number of years x 10 -0.28 (0.42) -0.67** (0.28) -0.80** (0.35)   -0.38*** (0.14) 
Work experience since leaving school 
Number of years x 10 -7.9*** (1.7) -6.4*** (1.0) -9.0*** (2.0)   -2.1*** (0.38) 
Squared number of years x 100 1.6*** (0.36) 1.4*** (0.24) 1.8*** (0.44)   0.49*** (0.10) 
Type of employment (2008) (baseline = employee) 
Employee of a sole proprietor 4.2* (2.2) 2.2* (1.3) 3.6 (2.3) -0.76 (1.6) 1.6*** (0.61) 
Casual worker 72.3*** (5.5) 78.9*** (8.4) 61.5*** (2.6) 76.6*** (15.2) 25.5 (20.0) 
Self-employed 4.1* (2.4) 0.99 (1.2) 1.2 (1.7) 3.3 (2.4) -0.073 (0.42) 
Member of an unincorporated company -3.5 (2.2) -1.7 (1.1) -1.9 (1.6) -1.4 (1.5) -0.29 (0.39) 
Work schedule (2008)           
Part-time 17.8*** (3.2) 14.6*** (2.8) 20.6*** (2.3) 13.6*** (4.1) 4.0*** (1.1) 
Evening, night, weekend work  1.5* (0.83) 0.93* (0.53) 1.4** (0.70) 1.5** (0.78) -0.11 (0.20) 
Telework  11.6*** (3.4) 6.8*** (2.2) 6.3** (2.6) 6.7*** (2.4) 0.39 (0.56) 
24 
 
Irregular work pattern 4.1*** (1.4) 2.6*** (0.83) 3.3*** (0.97) 1.8* (1.0) 0.58 (0.35) 
Firm ownership (2008)           
Foreign (more than 50 per cent) -1.5* (0.87) -2.4*** (0.68) -2.0** (0.93) -1.4 (1.6) -0.76*** (0.25) 
Firm size (number of employees, 2008) (baseline = more than 10) 
1 15.7*** (3.1) 12.1*** (2.2) 20.3*** (2.7) 6.7** (3.2) 2.6*** (0.95) 
2–4 1.5 (1.4) 1.7** (0.78) 2.3* (1.3) 0.85 (1.5) 0.37 (0.34) 
5–10 -1.5 (1.2) -0.73 (0.65) -0.84 (0.93) -2.9** (1.1) 0.34 (0.32) 
does not know (but < 11) 3.3 (4.4) 2.3 (2.3) 2.9 (3.7) 2.8 (4.0) -0.17 (0.71) 
Economic sector (2008) (baseline = industry) 
Agriculture 15.7*** (1.8) 9.9*** (0.96) 8.6*** (2.0) 9.8*** (1.9) 1.1*** (0.43) 
Construction 3.3** (1.7) 2.6*** (1.0) 4.6** (1.9) 0.29 (1.4) 1.3*** (0.45) 
Transportation 20.5*** (2.7) 13.9*** (1.3) 25.0*** (1.3) 15.5*** (2.4) 0.83** (0.40) 
Trade and accommodation -0.85 (1.0) 0.012 (0.68) 1.4 (1.1) -1.0 (0.71) 0.21 (0.28) 
Services 1.3 (1.2) 1.2 (0.76) 2.2 (1.3) 0.28 (0.94) 0.71** (0.32) 
Education, health, public admin. 3.8*** (1.0) 2.5*** (0.63) 2.5*** (0.95) 3.2*** (0.89) 0.14 (0.21) 
Region (2008)           
Micro-regional unemployment rate 18.3** (7.8) 10.6** (5.3) -1.6 (6.6) 16.7** (6.8) -1.8 (2.0) 
Capital Budapest 6.8*** (2.4) 5.6*** (1.8) 14.6*** (2.9) 6.4** (3.2) 1.0* (0.62) 
Year (baseline = 2001) 
Year: 2002 0.30 (0.28) 0.13 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48)   -0.057 (0.32) 
Year: 2003 -0.033 (0.32) -0.12 (0.42) 0.15 (0.48)   0.028 (0.34) 
Year: 2004 -0.42 (0.35) -0.42 (0.48) -0.11 (0.53)   -0.41 (0.30) 
Year: 2005 -0.75** (0.37) -0.97** (0.41) -0.65 (0.47)   -0.50* (0.29) 
Year: 2006 -0.63 (0.41) -0.63 (0.40) -0.082 (0.47)   -0.17 (0.29) 
       
  from non-reporting to 
reporting 
(equation (8)) 
(Average estimated probability)         35.8 (2.7) 
First full year in current job         29.9 (5.0) 
Note: see Table 5. For the RE linear model the estimates with cluster-robust standard errors are displayed. Standard errors of average marginal effects 
for all other models were calculated by bootstrapping the estimated model 1,000 times. For the RE probit models with and without selection the 
gllapred command of GLLAMM package of Stata was used. Notations for significance: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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4.2 DETERMINANTS OF UNDECLARED WORK 
According to Table 5, the models indicate a higher than average ratio and probability of 
undeclared work where this is expected on the basis of the predictions of theoretical models 
and everyday experience. After controlling for other variables, males are 3–4 percentage 
points more likely than females to perform undeclared work, which can possibly be 
explained by the higher risk aversion of females (Eckel and Grossman 2008). Differences by 
gender are much larger in permanent than in transitory undeclared work. Undeclared work 
is more prevalent in situations where the perceived chance of detection is lower, or where 
information asymmetries between the employer and the employee may be present, e.g. 
among casual workers (60–80 percentage points more prevalent), part-time workers (15–20 
percentage points), people doing telework or working from home (6–12 percentage points) 
and people with an irregular work pattern (2–4 percentage points). Again, the differences in 
magnitude are larger in permanent than in transitory non-reporting, and in permanent non-
reporting are fairly significant.  
Holding everything else fixed, new entrants are 2–4 percentage points more likely to be 
engaged in undeclared work. This result, as well as the above-average probability of 
transition to reported work after the first full year of tenure, may be explained by the fact 
that – according to the LFS – the share of fixed-term contracts is much higher in the first full 
year (16 per cent) than in subsequent years (less than 3 per cent on average). Hence workers 
may start a job undeclared, on a fixed-term contract, and later become reported when they 
switch to an open-ended contract.  
Workers in micro-firms, with only a single employee, are about 12–20 percentage points 
more likely to be unregistered (about 7 percentage points more likely to be permanently 
undeclared and 3 percentage points more likely to move from the reported to the non-
reported state in the transitory regime). The differences between other firm size categories 
are not significant. The probability of undeclared work in general (and permanent 
undeclared work in particular) is much higher in agriculture (8–16 percentage points higher) 
and transport (14–25 percentage points) than in industry, while construction and personal 
services (education, health care) also show slightly higher probabilities. This last result may 
be due to the presence of unregistered private teachers and health care professionals. Areas 
affected by high unemployment (perhaps due to demand-side factors, such as the high ratio 
of the minimum wage to the average wage) and Budapest (perhaps due to the smaller role of 
personal interactions) face a significantly greater prevalence of undeclared work. A 1 
percentage point higher unemployment rate in a micro-region increases permanent non-
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reporting by a substantial 0.1–0.2 percentage points. There was no trend visible in the extent 
of undeclared work between 2001 and 2006. 
Holding other factors fixed, undeclared work is most prevalent among people with 
secondary education. Those with apprentice-based vocational or primary education and 
college graduates report more working days (1–2 percentage points more), while the figure 
for university graduates is 3–5 percentage points higher than for comparable people with 
secondary education. The differences come exclusively from permanent undeclared work, 
which in all other categories is 3–4 percentage points lower than among those with 
secondary education; the coefficients for the transitory probability are not significant. Thus 
education and permanent undeclared work are in a reverse U-shaped relationship. Finally, 
young people and people near retirement age are significantly more likely to be unreported: 
the probability of undeclared work is lowest around 25 years after leaving school. 
Overall, there is much more heterogeneity in probability in the permanent than in the 
transitory regime. Explanatory variables that are associated with economic incentives (such 
as level of education) play a substantially larger role in determining permanent non-
reporting, while transitory non-reporting is rather random and is affected by proxies of 
administrative difficulties and possible negligent behaviour on the part of employees or 
employers (e.g. part-time or casual workers). In light of this, it is interesting to find that – 
after controlling for other factors – foreign ownership has a significant negative effect on 
temporary, but not on permanent undeclared work. 
4.3 GOODNESS OF FIT AND LONG-TERM SIMULATIONS  
Before simulating long-term scenarios of undeclared work at the individual level, using our 
two-regime model, we first note that this simple model is indeed able to reproduce the 
observed patterns of non-reporting in our sample. To show this, using the model we 
simulated undeclared work scenarios many times for each worker in the sample, and 
calculated the distribution of the number of undeclared years. Table A2 in the Appendix 
displays the mean, standard deviation and 5 per cent and 95 per cent quantiles of the 
simulated ratios of workers who are undeclared for exactly 0, 1, …, 6 years. All but one of the 
observed ratios are within the 5 per cent and 95 per cent simulated quantiles, and the 
remaining case is within the corresponding 1 per cent and 99 per cent quantiles. Not 
surprisingly, a formal chi-square test does not reject – even at the 10 per cent level – that the 
observed distribution of undeclared years comes from the model-predicted distribution. 
Thus the model captures two important patterns – the distinction between permanent and 
transitory non-reporting and the mild persistence of transitory non-reporting. We also note 
that the complexity of the model is indeed required to achieve an appropriate fit. For 
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instance, the ratio of 2–5 years of non-reporting would be underestimated if the transition 
probability from the non-reported to the reported state did not depend on tenure in the 
current job (first year vs. afterwards). 
In our long-term simulations we generate individual undeclared work patterns for ten 
years because, according to the LFS, a worker spends ten consecutive years on average in the 
same job, provided she has spent at least two years there. Figure A2 in the Appendix displays 
the simulated distribution of the number of undeclared years in a ten-year window for 
workers who were in the sample throughout the period 2001–2006, split by their levels of 
education (lower than secondary, secondary and tertiary). Although the average time spent 
undeclared during the ten-year window is 1.0 years for workers with at most secondary 
education and 0.5 years for those with tertiary education, the differences are substantially 
larger for permanent non-reporting: 6.1, 7.5 and 2.8 per cent of workers from the three 
groups are never reported to the authorities in the ten-year simulated window. This 
illustrates that the long-term burden of undeclared work is more variable across people and 
socio-economic groups than cross-sectional differences would suggest, because a typical 
undeclared worker is not sporadically, but rather permanently unreported to the pension 
authorities.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we used a unique set of matched administrative and survey data to analyse 
unreported employment at the individual level in Hungary, with the help of random-effects 
panel models with endogenous selection and with a two-regime dynamic model.  
We found that about 9.5–11 per cent of working time reported in the LFS by permanently 
employed workers did not appear in the NPID register in 2001–2006. We estimated that 
only about one-sixth of the discrepancy could be attributed to breaks in work during 
employment relationships perceived as continuous by the LFS respondents. 
The results reinforce the idea that the labour input method advocated in various 
European countries and at the EU level (GHK/FGB, 2009), can be a simple, yet reliable 
method for estimating the size and evolution of informal employment, although it tends to 
overestimate the true magnitude of black work by a few percentage points, since some 
administrative records are missing for technical reasons. 
The estimated effects of individual, firm-specific and regional variables – especially on 
permanent undeclared work – suggest that non-reporting is a sign of black work, rather than 
a result of technical failure. Importantly, we observed below-average reporting rates in part-
time work, non-standard work patterns, work at home and telework – various forms of 
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‘atypical employment’ that are gaining ground in European labour markets. Our results on 
lower reporting rates among males, in small firms and in some sectors such as agriculture 
roughly coincide with the findings of other studies on undeclared work (e.g. survey-based 
results in European Commission, 2014, for the EU, and Semjén et al., 2009, for Hungary 
covering roughly the same period) and on more general forms of tax evasion, such as wage 
underreporting and envelope wages (Meriküll and Staehr, 2010, for the Baltic states; Elek et 
al., 2012, for Hungary). Education and undeclared work seem to be in a reverse U-shaped 
relationship (see Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; Elek et al., 2012; Paulus, 2015, for the effect of 
education on some other forms of tax evasion).  
The findings have clear implications for health care and pension eligibility. Workers 
whose administrative data are missing (for whatever reason) are only entitled to emergency 
treatment unless they insure themselves on an individual basis (which rarely happens in 
Hungary). We found the proportion of such workers to be quite high (about 1 in 10) – even in 
a sample that excluded employment spells of less than two years.  
Expected pensions are also affected by non-reporting, and we could examine this with 
our panel data. We found that about 6 per cent of workers were permanently undeclared. 
Across a 40-year labour market career, employees who are unreported for their whole tenure 
in a job (ten years on average) receive a pension that is about 15 per cent lower than their 
fully reported counterparts, according to recent Hungarian rules (Pénzügyi tudakozó, 2016). 
However, people permanently unreported in a ten-year time window have a high probability 
of being unreported before and after, too; and so their total loss is even higher.  
Finally, as a more technical conclusion, we found that explicitly modelling the dynamics 
of the dependent variable in a panel data setting not only gives greater insight into the data-
generating process, but may also yield more efficient parameter estimates than simple panel 
data methods – in our case, some variables became significant only after permanent and 
transitory non-reporting were separated. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
 Average non-reporting rates in the estimation sample (per cent) 
 
Non-reporting rate Unreported 
days 
Unreported 
dummy 
Always 
unreported  
Transitorily 
unreported*  
Average 9.5 9.2 6.6 2.9 
Gender     
Male 13.4 13.1 9.6 3.5 
Female 5.7 5.4 3.5 2.3 
Age (2006 for ‘always unreported’)     
15–29 years 12.6 11.9 7.4 4.3 
30–49 years 9.0 8.8 6.7 2.6 
50+ years 9.6 9.4 6.0 3.3 
Level of education (2008)     
Primary or less (0–8 classes) 9.2 8.8 6.5 3.1 
Apprentice-based vocational 10.3 9.9 7.0 3.3 
Vocational or general secondary 10.6 10.4 7.7 2.6 
College 6.5 6.4 3.9 2.7 
University 5.1 5.0 2.8 2.0 
Type of employment relationship (2008)     
Employee 7.0 6.7 4.8 2.2 
Employee of a sole proprietor 15.1 14.0 6.7 8.2 
Casual worker 90.5 92.9 88.9 50.0 
Self-employed 27.6 27.4 21.8 7.2 
Member of an unincorporated company 7.7 7.5 4.7 3.2 
Occupation (2008, in order of non-
reporting) 
    
Agricultural 38.9 38.4 32.0 9.0 
Skilled service workers 27.0 26.8 24.0 3.3 
Skilled construction workers 14.1 13.2 8.8 5.2 
Porters, guards 13.4 11.9 7.6 4.2 
Professionals (except teachers and doctors) 11.4 11.4 7.7 4.0 
Elementary  11.3 10.5 7.0 4.3 
Drivers 9.8 9.6 6.9 2.3 
Skilled blue collars in trade and catering 7.7 7.0 3.2 3.6 
Skilled industrial workers 7.5 7.3 4.9 2.6 
Administrators 7.2 7.1 5.2 2.7 
Technicians 6.3 6.2 5.4 1.4 
Cleaners 5.4 5.1 2.6 3.1 
Managers 5.0 4.8 1.7 3.2 
Office clerks 4.7 4.4 2.4 1.6 
Machine operators and assemblers 4.3 3.9 3.4 1.3 
Teachers and doctors 2.8 2.6 1.1 1.5 
Work schedule (2008)     
Part-time 31.7 30.8 19.8 11.8 
Evening, night and weekend work 13.5 13.2 9.5 3.6 
Telework  34.8 34.5 27.4 8.4 
Irregular work pattern 17.5 17.1 12.7 4.2 
Tenure in current job     
First full year 12.9 11.7 - 5.9 
More than one year 9.2 9.0 - 2.6 
Firm size (number of workers, 2008)     
1 34.8 34.8 28.0 9.4 
2–4 12.0 11.4 7.7 4.5 
5–10 5.6 5.2 2.4 3.2 
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does not know (but < 11) 13.7 13.9 8.5 4.8 
11 or more 7.2 7.0 5.1 2.2 
Firm ownership (2008)     
Domestic (<=50% foreign) 10.4 10.1 7.2 3.2 
Foreign (>50% foreign) 3.4 3.0 2.5 1.0 
Region (2008)     
Budapest 12.9 12.8 9.3 5.3 
Rest of the country 9.4 9.1 6.5 2.8 
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample.  
Unreported dummy = less than half of the workdays are reported in a given year. The ratio is given as 
a percentage of the person-years.  
Always unreported = never reported during the observed employment spell. The ratio is given as a 
percentage of the number of workers. 
* Transitorily unreported: the average of the unreported dummy for person-years of workers who 
were reported at least once during their observed employment period.  
By definition, the ‘always’ and ‘transitory’ columns do not add up exactly to the total column. 
All explanatory variables except for age and tenure refer to year 2008 measurements in LFS. They are 
time-invariant in most cases because the job of the workers did not change during the observed 
period. For the ‘always unreported’ dummy, age is categorized according to its 2006 value.  
Number of observations: 23,385 person-years covering 4,707 workers.  
 
 
Table A2 
 Descriptive statistics of the simulated ratios of workers undeclared for exactly 
𝒌 years (𝒌 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝟔) in the six-year period and the observed distribution in the 
sample (in per cent) 
 Number of undeclared years (𝑘)  
Ratios 
(per cent) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Observed  86.41 4.57 1.83 0.89 1.06 0.87 4.38 100.0 
Simulated         
 Mean 85.73 4.85 2.11 1.29 0.98 0.73 4.31 100.0 
 S. D. 0.65 0.39 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.35  
 Quantiles         
 5% 84.62 4.26 1.74 1.00 0.73 0.57 3.76  
 95% 86.84 5.53 2.49 1.60 1.21 0.93 4.91  
Note: simulation of non-reporting dummies based on observed characteristics of 4,707 workers in the 
matched LFS–NPID sample for 2001–2006, using the two-regime model and taking into account the 
variance-covariance matrix of its parameter estimates. Number of simulation draws: 1,000.  
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Figure A1 
 Reporting rates for employees of smaller and larger firms (1995-2006) 
 
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample for 1995–2006. Vertical lines indicate the 
years of two regulatory changes on NPID reporting. We use data for 2001–2006.  
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Figure A2 
 Simulated distribution of the number of unreported years in a ten-year time 
window 
 
Note: matched LFS–NPID sample. Level of education: lower = primary and 
apprentice-based vocational, secondary = vocational and general secondary, 
tertiary = college or university.  
 
0
5
1
0
7
5
8
0
8
5
9
0
ra
ti
o
 (
p
e
r 
c
e
n
t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
lower secondary
tertiary
